The Good Society and the Complexity of the Structure of Morality by Castaneda, Hector-Neri
IUSTITIA
Volume 3 | Number 1 Article 1
4-1-1975
The Good Society and the Complexity of the
Structure of Morality
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Indiana University
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/iustitia
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Law Commons, and the Theory,
Knowledge and Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in IUSTITIA by an
authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more
information, please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1975) "The Good Society and the Complexity of the Structure of Morality," IUSTITIA: Vol. 3 : No. 1 ,
Article 1.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/iustitia/vol3/iss1/1
The Good Society and the
Complexity of the Structure of
Morality
HECTOR-NERI CASTANEDA
In this paper I have two main purposes: (i) to outline the most general structure
of morality, which is the fundamental schema of a good society, and (ii) to indict
most of the mainstream views in the history of moral philosophy for their unchecked
tendency toward reductionism and oversimplification. The tendency to
oversimplification appears both in the gathering of the data for philosophical
theorizing and in the theorizing itself. I will also point out another major
recurring error in moral philosophy. I envision the day when moral philosophers,
after examining their ontological and their methodological assumptions, rally
to the banner of anti-reductionism and complexification. Since reductionism and
oversimplification are also widespread throughout the theory of the foundations
of social sciences, this particular battle may, hopefully, provide also a worthwhile
spectacle for the social scientists in this audience.
THE GOOD SOCIETY
A good society is a moral society.
Obviously, a moral society is one that somehow and to some significant degree
embodies the institution of morality. But what is morality? This is the crucial
question. I will not deal here with the other two questions: "How does a Society
embody or adopt the institution of morality?" and "What degrees of embodiment
are significant?" Clearly, the embodiment takes place through the morality
of the individuals' actions and the fairness of their institutions. But to elucidate
these we need the foundation provided by the answer to the first question. And
this answer will by itself be too large for us here.
A CLASSICAL ERROR IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
What exactiy is morality? This is a difficult question. It is usually made
more difficult by the natural assumption that an answer to it must yield an
This paper was delivered at the conference on The Goad Society, at the
University of Victoria, October 11-13, 1974.
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answer to the question "Why should one be moral?" This conflative assumption has
been one of the major sources of error throughout the history of moral philosophy.
It appears in Plato's idea that just action is profitable; in Kant's conception
of respect for the moral law and his view of moral autonomy; in Prichard's concept
of moral obligation as being itself a motive for action; in the views of contemporary
philosophers who tend to identify a moral duty with an overriding or with an
important duty; in those views that include the thesis that the principles of moral
obligation or moral rightness must be self-justifying. Perhaps the most serious
error that originates in that conflative assumption is the confusion of the nature
of morality with the nature of practical thinking in general.
I do not propose to discuss this error here. I have discussed it to my satisfaction
in some other places.' And I have also provided a system of theories that both
distinguishes from each other and relates to each other the structure of practical
thinking in general and the structure of moral practical thinking.2
ANOTHER CLASSICAL ERROR:
OVERSIMPLIFICATION AND REDUCTIONISM
Here I want to denounce another major error that also permeates the history
of moral philosophy. This error has some contacts with the previous one, but
it is an independent major error in its own right. It is the error of oversimplification
and reductionism. Most moral philosophers have explicitly adopted the view that
the whole of morality can be derived from, or reduced to, or somehow grounded
sufficiently on, some simple or not very complex feature like the following:
(i) overridingness-a moral principle being one that defeats any other
principle of action with which it conflicts;
(ii) importance-a moral problem being one which (a) the agent, or (b)
a certain set of people, considers as of the utmost importance, and moral
rules being those that provide solutions to such problems;
(iii) universalizability-a moral duty being one that the agent (or a
critic?) recognizing it takes it to be an instance of a general principle
in whose formulation there are no proper names or any other singular-
refering expressions;
(iv) lawlike universality-a moral duty is one which is determined by a
general proposition that the agent can will to be a universal law of nature;
(v) the greatest happiness of the greatest number-a moral duty being an
action that would bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest
number;
(vi) the greatest (net) utility-a moral duty being an action that has the
greatest product of moral or intrinsic value and probability of producing
such value.
A symptom of the reductionistic assumption is the assumption that there is
some non-disjunctive condition that is at once both necessary and sufficient for
moral obligatoriness. On the reductionistic assumption, there is some non-disjunctive
condition C such that the lone moral principle of duty is of the form: "Everybody
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ought morally to do an action A if and only if he/she is in condition C." A look
at morality reveals that there is no such main principle of morality. At any rate,
sound methodology requires that we start the investigation with an open mind
to reality, not fettered by the idea that there is just one simple condition that
is both necessary and sufficient for moral duties.
A historical note is fair at this point. Philosophers, like H.A. Prichard, who
have insisted that moral obligations differ qua their obligatoriness, and, like
David Ross, who have held that there are many irreducible principles of prima
facie moral duty, have been better observers of morality than most moral philosophers.
As you may remember, Ross was severely criticized for the complexity of his view,
indeed, for not having reduced his "heap of duties" to one principle!
Ross was of course right: morality is complex. In fact, morality is much more
complex than Ross thought. As we shall see, all of the principles Ross mentions
as formulating moral duties are only one segment of the total institution of
morality. Morality is an extremely complex super-institution that both joins
together the different members of, as well as the different institutions of, a
community, and guides the development and the criticism of the community.
Let us take a proto-philosophical look at what morality as an ongoing institution
does or is- supposed to do for a community and for the whole of humanity, not
to theorize yet, but only to fasten to some striking aspects of morality, however vague
they may be at this stage. Such aspects must be used both as data for theorization
and as criteria of adequacy for any proposed theory of the nature of morality.
Morality, or social morality, if you wish, thus avoiding a dilatory verbal
dispute, is a system of values and of principles of action, valid for all human
beings and all those beings who have the power to make plans and decisions,
and involves all those entities that possess the capacity for suffering. Clearly morality
has to include an array of very general and imposing assumptions about the
nature of thinking agents, whether human or not. It starts with the idea of a
domain of agents closed by causality, that is, a domain of agents linked by
criss-crossing causal relationships such that each agent affects another agent and
each one is affected by someone else in the domain. The ovule ideal of morality
is the ideal of all members of a causally closed domain of agents acting so as to
attain a maximal happiness, or self-realization, consistent with a maximal happiness
of each of the other agents of the domain. But this is only the ovule ideal. This ovule
has to be fertilized by several crucial assumptions about natural agents in order
to develop into the institution of morality as we know it. That ovule ideal does
not, for one thing, include much of social organization. That undeveloped ideal
could be satisfied by a society of angels living in an angelic environment. By
an angel I mean here a being all of whose interests are, not only internally
harmonious with each other, but are also totally harmonious with the interests
of all of the other members of the society. An angelic environment is one
that never frustrates the interests of any agent living, or existing, in it. But
morality as we conceive it in our attribution of moral duties and moral problems,
to ourselves and to others, is a more complex ideal that takes into account the
threefold non-angelic nature of the natural societies that have developed on this
planet: (i) our natural societies of human beings live in environments that are
unfriendly or at least very cantankerous; (ii) all human beings have interests
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that conflict with the interests of many others; and (iii) many of the interests
of every human being conflict with many others of his own interests. Furthermore,
(iv) all human beings have a very limited capacity for benevolence and tolerance;
(v) each one of them knows little about the consequences of his actions; and
(vi) most of them are unable to engage in detailed or abstract thinking for
very long periods. Thus, the institution of morality that can apply to natural
societies of such creatures as us has to consist not only of the outline of an
unreachable ideal of social organization, but also of a series of principles that
can bring some part of the ideal down to earth-to be tried and trampled perhaps
by us as we live our competetive lives full of jealousies and petty goals; to
be misunderstood by our ignorance, our inattention and our finite powers of
thinking and of loving; but also to be enjoyed and approached asymptotically
as we, or many among us, gain control of their powers of action and either
come to believe that decency is to their advantage or grow in sympathy toward
their fellow human beings. (I for the life of me cannot see how the complex
structure of morality that involves at its very core not only the formulation of
an unreachable ideal but also the unavoidable collision between that ideal and its
application, can be reduced to some of the simple features I mentioned before.)
Yet morality is more complex. Morality deals not only with the private or
direct relationships between agents in a causally closed domain as above characterized.
It recognizes the significance for the lives of the agents of a given closed domain,
both of the general partition of the agents in societies or communities and of
the many groupings of the agents within each society in institutions of different
sorts. Morality, thus, is a super-institution that prescribes a series of duties in our
direct, or private dealings with other agents, regardless of institutional or social
links, just by virtue of being members of the same closed causal domain, or by virtue
of being within a certain causal vicinity of each other. But it also prescribes duties
to comply with the rules of the institutions one belongs to. In this institutional
dimension, morality deals with the possible conflicts between institutional duties among
themselves. But morality also concerns itself with the possible conflicts between
its own demands along its direct or private dimension and its demands along its
institutional dimension. (Again, I ask you whether you can with a clear conscience
assume without more ado that these two additional levels of complexity can be
derived from, or reduced to, some such simple feature like universalibility, or
importance for an agent or more, or expected utility.)
There is still more complexity to be reckoned with. Morality demands that
the outline of the ideal be glimpsed steadily or often. Morality demands a steady watch
on the degree of conformity of the social structure, the institutional setup, and
the individual networks of private moral duties, to the envisagable outline of
an ideal society. Morality demands not only the revamping of institutions and
the reshaping of the individual motivational nature, but it also demands sometimes
a revolution in the very conception of morality that has pervaded a certain society.
Morality demands, sometimes, that some agents engage in attempting deep moral
progress. This deep progress hits at the roots of the well established assumptions
of a society that have been grounds for the establishment, and the criticism, of
institutions and for the formulation of direct interpersonal obligations; it is a
progress involving the alteration of the moral code itself, so as to bring the society
in question one step closer to the unreachable ideal.
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In short, morality is a super-institution that involves several layers of demands,
and involves the possibility of conflicts even within its own layers, and involves
the principles for the solution of such conflicts. Isn't it patent that no simple feature
like universalizability, importance, overridingness, the greatest happiness for the
greatest number, the greatest expected utility, or the greatest probability of this or
that, can be assumed to be able to account for all those levels of complexity in
the structure of morality?
SOME CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY FOR ANY THEORY OF MORALITY
The preceding observations on the multiple roles of morality and its many
tiers makes it obvious (at least it has made it obvious to me since the fall
of 1952) that the piecemeal technique of pure analytic philosophy cannot yield a view
of the total complex structure of morality. I want to underscore that I value not
only the detailed and slow-motion analysis of concepts, but I also value the
descriptions of linguistic usage that ordinary language philosophy has produced. The
former does provide philosophical illumination, and the latter constitute proto-
philosophical data that must be taken into account. But the architecture of the
moral edifice requires a synthetic contemplation, the putting together of the
different elements of morality in their master design. The analysis of the different
concepts that enter in the moral edifice are valuable, but they will be fully
illuminating only when they are placed, not against each other in the spurious
competition that the reductionistic views force upon them, and that has dominated
the dialectics of the last decades, but together in their proper positions in the
total pattern.
From the preceding preliminary examination of morality, and further observations
that anybody can make, we can distill the proto-philosophical criteria, listed
below, of adequacy for any philosophical theory of morality-or social morality,
if you wish. Naturally, the criteria of adequacy are vague. Their role is not to
constitute an analysis or theory of morality-since the theory is precisely the
outcome of the investigation. Their role is to demarcate some boundaries of the
future theory. Several of the criteria allow, because of their vagueness, of different
interpretations, and a few of them may appear at the proto-philosophical stage to be
in conflict. The different interpretations and the different ways of solving the
apparent conflicts is part and parcel of the problem of theorization. A theory has to
organize and illuminate the data; it cannot be a logical consequence of the data.
A theory is a posit, and several theories can be posited. The testing of a philosophical
theory proceeds in two directions: on the one hand, it must illuminate, and account
for, the initial data; on the other hand, it must be able to accommodate and
illuminate additional data. Here is another juncture at which most of the moral
philosophizing, of both old and recent past, has been dominated by the prejudice
of oversimplification, namely, oversimplification of the initial data. This is indeed
the third major error perennially committed throughout the history of moral
philosophy.
Here is a moderately complex set of data that any theory of morality has to
consider, illuminate, and conform with.
1. Morality is a huge system of propositions that includes: (a) the facts
of a segment of the world inhabited by a causally closed domain of
9
agents; (b) the laws of nature that apply to that segment of the world;
(c) normative principles that prescribe courses of actions. That is, morality
is a huge system of rules together with their empirical and nomological
grounds.
2. Morality is, thus, universal in that it applies to all the agents of a
causally closed domain.
3. Morality is pervasive in that it allows judgment upon all the actions of
each agent of a closed domain.
4. A moral rule is a proposition built upon the propositional matrix "X
ought morally to do A," or "X is required by morality to do A," where:
(i) the deontic expressions 'ought' and 'is required' have the general
normative meaning, and (ii) 'morally' and 'by morality' signal the special
features or qualifications that make a moral rule moral.
5. Hence, a total theory of morality includes both a theory of the meaning
of the adverb 'morally' and a theory of the meaning of the matrix "X ought-
to do A." The special theory of morality is the theory of the contribution
to the truth conditions of moral rules made by the qualification morally.
6. The moral rules are of several types: (a) some moral rules prescribe
actions in private transactions between members of the same causally
closed domain, regardless of their having (other) institutional relationships
or not; (b) some moral rules sanction the (non-moral) obligations
or duties determined by all (other) institutions; (c) some moral rules
demand the changing of the personality of an agent; (d) others require
the alteration or the destruction of the institutions of a given community;
(e) others urge the modification of the moral outlook of a given community
within a closed domain.
7. A moral system of rules has in some sense a higher character than that
of any other normative system. In the first place, it is more comprehensive,
i.e., that the class of acts that fall under morality is larger than the class
pertaining to any other normative system, including the total legal
system of a community. In the second place, the other normative systems
may be or are criticized from a moral or ethical point of view. A bill
is declared just, or unjust; a practice is fair, or unfair; an institution
can be immoral; the rules of a game may be said to be unfair, etc.
8. In some sense (to be elucidated by a theory) the higher character of
morality is connected with a superiority of ends. Morality has something
to do with the highest ends and basic needs of the agents of each closed
domain.
9. Happiness is, or is connected with, the highest ends of men. But it is
a part of morality that there is or may be a conflict between our personal
happiness and our moral duties. Moreover, from the moral point of
view, in this conflict duty is stronger; so that morality includes the
demand of some measure of self-sacrifice.
10. Notwithstanding, there is a limit beyond which morality cannot reauire
self-sacrifice.
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11. In spite of the fact that morality is in some way concerned with men's
ends, it is not the function of morality to prescribe the means that are
adequate for the achievement of men's highest ends. Nor does morality
prescribe ends. Rather, morality's subject matter is both the organization
of an agent's ends and the harmonization of all agents' highest ends.
Morality is concerned with some supreme limits of human freedom to
take up ends.
12. Thus, there is a sense in which the moral norms are, in Kant's term, not
genuinely hypothetical imperatives prescribing the means to attain given
ends. They do not, pace Socrates and Plato, prescribe the means for
happiness. But moral rules are not categorical imperatives in Kant's
sense-since they need not prescribe anything binding on a rational
agent just because he is rational. This is a datum resulting from our keeping
fast to the independence of the questions "What is morality?" and "Why
should one be moral?"
13. Motives are related to ends. There is a sense in which morality requires
the absence of desire or inclination in the doing of one's duty.
14. Morality is a social affair. Indeed, the self-sacrifice required by morality
is always in reference to someone else's interest. The conflict between
one's own happiness and one's duty is related to a conflict between
one's own and someone else's interest or good.
15. Morality provides a general and neutral point of view from which all
conflicts among agents can have a solution. This does not rule out the
principle that in some cases an impartial lottery may be used to solve
a given conflict.
16. The moral consideration of everybody's interest is such that in some
sense, as Bentham put it, everybody is to count for one and nobody for
more than one. And as Kant added: morality bestows upon each agent a
dignity, rather than a price: the life and the highest ends of an agent
are not morally substitutable by the life or the ends of another agent.
17. Morality provides a point of view from which issue solutions to all possible
conflicts of (non-moral) duties an agent may encounter because of his
membership in several institutions.
18. Morality provides also a perspective from which issue solutions to the
possible conflicts between institutional duties morally sanctioned, and moral
duties pertaining to private relationships.
19. Morality is at least partially within human reach. In some sense ought
implies can; particularly, ought-morally implies can.
20. As a special case of the above, it is possible for the agent to know what
his concrete duties are on many given occasions. Morality prescribes for
all: for the super-intelligent and for the mediocre, for the knowledgeable
about the ways of the world and for the not so well informed.
21. There can be such, thing as moral progress.
22. Morality sometimes may demand the stimulation of moral progress.
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PRACTICAL THINKING IN GENERAL
Criteria 4, 5, and 12 stand in diametral opposition to the views of many
philosophers of the past, and of many of the present. I have no time to engage in
detailed criticism of any philosopher, but I do hope that some of the young
philosophers will be motivated enough to produce fully detailed, conclusive and
illuminating studies on what I earlier called the first major error in the history of
moral philosophy. I want now to point out that the complexity I am defending, namely,
that morality comes through the study of the adverb 'morally' in "X ought morally to
do A", is more serious than what it may appear at first sight. Evidently, adverbial
entities are derivative, and the theories about these presuppose, so to speak, the
theories of the verbal and substantival entities on which they depend. Thus, first, as
against Prichard and Kant, for instance, morality is what the adverb 'morally'
expresses, signals, denotes (I don't care which semantical terminology you want
to use), and not a special meaning of the word 'ought'. (Isn't it obvious, really, that
morality is what 'morally' expresses, not what 'ought' means?) Second, the
sentential matrix "X ought-to do A" within which our adverb belongs is a complex
matrix. It has an auxiliary or modal verb, 'ought', which applies to the matrix
"X . . .- to do A". What this matrix expresses is the atomic unit of content for
practical thinking. What the matrix "X-to do A" expresses I call a practition. First-
person practitions, expressed by "I-to do A" are intentions; second- and third-person
practitions I call prescriptions. Thus, practitions are either intentions or prescriptions.
Practitions are the fundamental units of practical thinking, just as propositions
are the fundamental units of contemplative thinking. I cannot go into a discussion of
practitions here. Fortunately, I have done this elsewhere.3
My first point at this juncture is this. The separation of the special theory
of morality from the general theory of practical thinking is absolutely required by
the nature of the moral rules, as indicated in criteria 4 and 5. My next point is
this. The theory of morality has simply to acept the complexity required by the
previous separation of the two layers of theory. Thirdly, there are still other
complexities. The general theory of the ought structure embedded in moral ought
principles is itself complex. It includes the special theory of ought and the general
theory of practitions. Since practical thinking, including moral thinking, involves
the thinking of duties, permissions, rights, and wrongs in relation to circumstances,
i.e., to what is actually true in this or that case, practical thinking includes or
envelopes contemplative thinking. Thus, the theory of the ought structure, often
called deontic logic or the logic of norms, includes in its more advanced stages the
whole of the logic of propositions.
All those complexities are purely formal. But there are yet other types of
complexity. Practical thinking, whether moral or not, is thinking that has a very
special, internal causality. Now, the practicality of practical thinking must be
diferentiated from the practicality of moral thinking-and the latter must be
further differentiated from the practicality of the institution of morality. These
complexities must be accepted. The oversimplifying telescoping of the practicality
(whatever that may be) of (the institution of ) morality with the practicality of
moral thinking is a serious error. A further egregious error is to confuse the practicality
of practical thinking whatever its type with the practicality of moral thinking. These
are the errors that lead to viewing overridingness as the characteristic trait of
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morality. This erroneous view is fostered further by the analytic habit, on the
one hand, of paying attention to details and not considering the different systematic
structures embedded in a simple moral judgment, and, on the other hand, of delaying
indefinitely the moment of theorization.
Consider one example. Kant's brilliant discussion in the Grundlegung of what
he calls respect for the law is one of the most insightful and penetrating passages
in the whole history of practical philosophy. Every moral philosopher ought
to know it by heart. Yet is has two crucial errors. First, it attributes the internal
causality of respect for the law to the moral law. This is an instance of the error
of confusing practical thinking with moral thinking. Second, the passage attributes
the internal causality in question to a law, i.e., an ought-judgment. This is correct
up to the point that an overriding first-person ought-judgment involves an intention,
i.e., a first-person practition. But Kant errs by taking the practicality of ought
itself, or of an ought-judgment, as primitive, without pushing further and seeing
that the primal practicality belongs to practitions, especially intentions. This second
error is perhaps not so much a consequence of Kant's oversimplifying assumptions;
but it is the result of superficial theorization-or a result of both. Again, I cannot
go into a detailed discussion of Kant's respect for the law or the practicality of
practical thinking. But I have said something further about these topics elsewhere.4
Fortunately, here we only need the remark that the special theory of the
qualification morally is to be embedded in the system of theories dealing with
the ought framework, the practicality of practical thinking, the relationships between
propositions and practitions, etc. In particular, we shall lay it down as a fundamental
principle that each system of moral rules has the general structure studied by
deontic logic-and I mean a complex deontic propositional-practitional structure.5
THE THEORY OF MORALITY: A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
One of my oldest philosophical ideas is that the complexity of morality, just
partially represented by the criteria listed above, can only be accounted for by
a theory built upon the theoretical thesis that:
(M*) Morality (or, if you wish, the institution of social morality) is a
system of systems, some of which are themselves supersystems of
norms, each of the systems being moral by some peculiar feature of
its own.
(M*) highlights the contrast between my non-reductionist respect for whatever
complexity reality of a concept possesses and the reductionistic assumption of
simplicity characteristic of most moral philosophers. Some of the systems mentioned
in (M*) I already knew twenty-five years ago. The passing of time has not
weakened my respect for complexity, but has in fact reinforced it. Reductionism of
the mental to the physical is still running rampant, but, on the whole, in the last
two decades we have seen the fall of many reductionisms. In the case of morality,
we have seen the blind alleys into which some moral reductionisms have been
withering.
The most important systems included in the supersystem of morality are these:
(A) A system of principles of actions that govern (otherwise) non-
institutional relationships between any two agents. I call it the
13
euergetical systems, from the Greek word £UEpYETEW meaning to
show kindness, to do good. Here belong rules like, "It is wrong to kill
a man, except in self-defense," practitions like "Don't cause pain for the
sole purpose of enjoying the sight of pain behavior," and "Always
treat others as ends in themselves." The euergetical principles are
generally vague, since they are to fill in the private interstices between
institutional relationships. Ross's principles of prima facie duty
belong here.
(B) A super-institutional system, which I call the ethical system, and
includes two components:
(1) A hierarchial arrangement of all non-moral normative systems
that demand some actions from some agent in a given
community. This arrangement I call an ethos. An ethos ranks
all the (non-moral) institutions of the community in question
including all the contracts, agreements, and promises made
by each agent. An institution at a given time t is a normative
system together with an assignment of roles to individuals
and objects at time t. Promises and agreements are mini-
institutions. Each promise is by itself a complete normative
system. (Here is another juncture where the great errors I have
been pointing out have consequences: the nature of promises
has been commonly misunderstood and philosophers have spoken
of a very mysterious, actually non-existing, alleged moral
duty to keep promises.)6
(2) A norm establishing the solution of conflicts of duties based
on institutions by prescribing the ethical obligatoriness of the
action prescribed by the norm in conflict that comes higher
in the ethos.
(C) A schema of the ideal of morality, which includes several departments:
(1) The system of the general assumptions about moral agency,
that is, the minimal characterization of an agent, i.e., a being
capable of practical thinking, (whether human or not), for whom
morality prescribes duties.
(2) The theory of happiness, that is, the characterization of the
most formal conditions determining the self-realization value
of actions.
(3) The principle of the moral ordering of actions, classes of actions,
and normative systems.
(D) The system of the most general guidelines for the creation of moral
codes, i.e., the most general principles determining, on the adoption
of certain general assumptions both about the nature of the agents
composing the community and about the environment of the community,
including technological circumstances, the moral outlook of the
community.
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(E) The formal metathetical system. This is the schema of a normative
system whose norms prescribe the alteration of the moral outlook of the
community, thus, guiding the moral progress of both the community
and its members. The change of moral outlook consists primarily of a
change of the ethos, or of the relationship between the ethical and
the euergetical system.
The preceding outline of the structure of morality is undoubtedly complex.
But it cannot be faulted for this-or not any more, I hope. Clearly, it conforms to
the criteria of adequacy gathered above. Hence, if this outline is at all faulty-
it can only be because it is not complex enough! Naturally, further errors may
creep in in the development of each of the five systems (A) - (E) composing morality.
The five systems of assumptions and principles of action composing the
institution of (social) morality must be developed. These five subtheories of morality
are complex, and I will not go into them here. Fortunately, I can refer the reader
to a detailed discussion of them in The Structure of Morality, Chapter 8.
Here I can discuss only the theory in general terms, hoping that the preceding
discussion suffices to establish my contention that moral philosophy has really
too long been suffering under oversimplifying reductionistic prejudices. Now,
several things must be mentioned about our theory of the nature of morality.
First, the philosophical theory about the structure of morality can be sufficiently
finished even if the full details of some segments, e.g., the system of general
assumptions about moral agency, or the assumptions about human nature or the
environment, cannot ever be formulated in full. Second, the philosophical theory
of the structure of morality allows that there be different assumptions about the
natures of the agents of a certain community or about the environment of a
community. Thus, the philosophical theory about the institution of morality is
compatible with there being different moralities, each containing its own moral
outlook, all being moralities because they conform to the same structure. Third,
the philosophical theory of morality is normative in the sense that it provides
the schemata of normative principles, and also in the sense that it formulates precisely
the norms constituting the ethical obligation referred to in (B) (2). This obligation
is, of course, formal, since the philosophical discussion cannot specify any ethos.
The theory is also normative in that it mentions some euergetical principles.
There is always one reader of moral philosophy who remembers his naturalistic
fallacy: that values or rights or oughts cannot be derived from facts. The one here
today will ask whether I am committing the naturalistic fallacy. Well, perhaps.
But the naturalistic fallacy, like all so-called fallacies, whether formal or informal, is
only a principle warning to the effect that not all arguments of a certain form are
valid. Elsewhere I have agued that the naturalistic fallacy was born as the marriage
of the correct idea that deontic logic is not reducible to non-deontic logic, with an
erroneous oversimplification assumption. I have contended that the unity of experience
requires in general that there be bridging implications connecting the different realms
of experience. Thus, there must be bridging implications connecting oughts with facts.
It is really as simple as that.7
Furthermore, the analysis of normative concepts often involves norms or norm
schemata. Consider the concept chess. Its analysis included the listing of the rules
of initial position of the chessmen as well as the rules of their movement. Likewise, the
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analysis of the concept morally, which is much more complex and more normative
than the concept chess, clearly has to include some norms and norm schemata.
"But," the questioner may reply, "the rules of chess are not binding on anyone
who does not play, or want to play, chess. Thus, the chess philosopher can mention
the rules of chess without being bound by them. On the other hand, morality is
different. Moral rules are binding on everyone. So, you are not keeping your
philosophical neutrality if you analyze morality in a normative way." This is a
useful reply, including its questionable part, the one about the universal bindingness
of morality. Here we find the insinuation that morality is inescapable for a man,
for a thinking being. Here we find lurking the first great error in the history of
philosophy I have been trying to exorcise. We simply must learn to separate practical
thinking and rational practical thinking from moral thinking. One verbal warningI
One can always define 'rational' so that moral thinking is implied by rational thinking.
But this verbal trick does not solve any problems. We must recognize that a being
can be rational in the original sense of the word: he can think, make good deductions
and inductions. He can be endowed with the capacity for practical thinking besides,
and then he can be capable of knowing himself well, knowing his environment
just as well, making decisions and adopting plans, reasoning flawlessly about means
and ends, and about all other matters. In short, he can be a skillful mathematician,
physicist, chemist, and always succeed in the realization of his predictions and the
fulfillment of his plans-without adopting morality. Don't call him rational, if
you don't want to. But at least remember that the structure of morality can be
understood fully and masterfully described by some such non-rational, or irrational,
creature. "What is morality?" is an entirely different question from "Why should
one be moral, i.e., why should one adopt the institution of morality?"
CONCLUSION
The structure of the institution of (social) morality is very complex. Consequently,
the structure of a good natural society, a non-angelic society, of imperfect and
finite thinking beings, is very complex. Such society must have most of its members
concerned both with their own moral development and with the moral development
of their institutions. A good society requires political leaders and administrators
capable of improving both the lot of the unprivileged and the morality of the
existing institutions. Doubtlessly, a good society must have scientists learning about
humankind and about the world, so as to provide both better grounds for, and
revisions of, the fundamental assumptions of the institution of morality. But it
must have also leaders capable of understanding when and how a moral code ought
to be changed, as well as some members capable of teaching the needed moral
changes to the rest of society.
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'See especially, H-N. Castaneda, "Imperatives, Oughts, and Moral Oughts," The Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 44 (1966): 277-300; reprinted as Ch. 7 in H-N. Castaneda, The Structure
of Morality (Springfield, Illinois: Charles Thomas Publisher, 1974); see also H-N. Castaneda,
Thinking and Doing; The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions (Dorchet, Neth: Reidel
Publishing Co., 1975).
'For the theory of practical thinking in general see The Structure of Morality, Chs. 2-6, and for
the special theory of morality see Ch. 8.
'See The Structure of Morality, Chs. 2, 3, and 5, where there are references to other papers.
'See H-N. Castaneda, "Purpose, Action and Ought: An Integrated Theory of Action" and
"Intentions, Practical Thinking and Wants," being edited by Norman Care and Robert Grimm
(to be published by Yale University Press), which will appear in a volume containing the papers
of the 1974 Oberlin Philosophy Colloquium.
5See The Structure of Morality, Chs. 2-5, and the beginning and the end of Ch. 8.
6On promises see The Structure of Morality, p. 8.
'H-N. Castaneda, "On the Conceptual Autonomy of Morality," NoAs VII (1973): 67-77.
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